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The offence of sedition: Its history, its
current status in Australian and
international law, and its constitutionality
Anthony Gray*
The law of sedition has a long history in the common law. Government
attempts to discourage and punish dissent and criticism are not new. This
article notes current examples where laws of Australian states continue to
punish sedition. It argues that this kind of law is not compatible with
Australia’s implied freedom of political communication, which reflects
Australia’s democratic governance structure. Democracy requires full and
frank discussion of political issues, including criticism of those in
government. On the other hand, freedom of speech is not absolute, so
government regulation of speech which urges or incites violence is
legitimate.
Introduction
Freedom of speech is very topical at present on a range of fronts. There is a
significant debate around freedom of speech within universities.1 There have
been concerns about attempts to shut down or censor particular speakers in
Australia, including Bettina Arndt, in recent months. Some speakers have
been asked to pay for security, where their speech garners sometimes violent
protest. This is part of a bigger problem in the United States, with so-called
‘no platforming’ of speakers whose views are considered unpalatable. The
High Court last year struck out anti-protester legislation on constitutional free
speech grounds,2 and at the time of writing is considered an appeal against
legislation prohibiting protest within close proximity to an abortion clinic.3
The question of acceptable limits on free speech is live.
The focus of this particular work will be on criticism of government, and
the extent to which the law either protects it, punishes it, or is neutral towards
it. Again, this has been topical. A recent controversy involved the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, with the former chairman of the organisation
resigning after apparently seeking to have sacked a staff member who had
published material critical of the government. He apparently believed that
members of the government ‘hated’ that particular journalist, though he made
it clear he was not specifically directed by anyone to have the journalist
dismissed. This episode is just another example of attempts to censor, one way
or another, views that government might find to be undesirable. This is not a
new phenomenon. Indeed, part of the basis of this article is that governments
for hundreds of years have sought to punish, deter and dissuade the expression
* Professor of Law, University of Southern Queensland.
1 Robert French, ‘Free Speech and the Law on Campus — Do we need a Charter of Rights for
Universities?’ (Speech delivered at the 8th Austin Asche Oration in Law and Governance,
Charles Darwin University and Australian Academy of Law, 17 September 2018).
2 Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328.
3 Transcript of Proceedings, Clubb v Edwards [2018] HCATrans 210 (11 October 2018).
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of views critical of their governance. The question is how has the law
responded in the past, and how should it respond. In a sense, the issue is
considered to be timeless.
Since early times within democratic forms of government, there has been
possible conflict between the need to preserve a given system of governance
within society, and the right of members in that society to contribute to debate
within it, including matters of governance. That debate might include criticism
of existing governance structures. A potential clash exists between two great
interests, preserving existing institutional structures in society, yet ensuring
individuals within that society can actively contribute to its governance, by
participating in debate and proposing reform. Which interest has prevailed,
and which interest should prevail? How do we preserve democratic structures,
while permitting the kinds of robust discussions such a system contemplates
and indeed requires?
This conflict is evident in early Greek and Roman political systems. While
Plato linked democratic government with the ability of citizens (some, at
least) to contribute to debate, he favoured some censorship. He argued
material critical of the gods should not be published, due to the harm it would
cause society. When Augustus took power in ancient Rome, he punished
government critics. He ordered the burning of books thought to contain such
criticism. Around 12 BC Augustus began to enforce an old Twelve Tables law
prohibiting defamation, and another prohibiting ‘violation of majesty’.
Prosecutions were brought against professors who questioned his policies.
Labienus and Severus were among the targets. Later it became a crime to
possess material thought treasonous or seditious. When Tiberius ascended to
power, proceedings for ‘literary treason’ expanded. The death penalty was
used against those convicted of treason, one example being poet Clutorius. He
was executed after daring to write a poem mocking an heir to government
power.
I will now explain how both English and American law have sought to
reconcile these competing interests, before considering the Australian
position. Both jurisdictions are critical. Those who wrote the Australian
Constitution drew upon what they considered the best aspects of British and
American constitutionalism. By understanding the historical development of
anti-sedition laws there, we are in a stronger position to consider our nation’s
position, and whether our existing laws are constitutionally valid. At the time
of writing, there remains various legislation in Australia that seeks to
criminalise and punish the expression of views critical of government, in some
form. The federal government re-legislated in this area in 2010. Evidently, it
believes the issues remain live. However, it is important to understand the
extent to which sedition legislation is consistent with our constitutional
commitment to freedom of expression. The ultimate objective of this article is
to determine whether existing sedition legislation in Australia is
constitutionally valid.
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Criticising rulers — English law
English law dealt with criticism of rulers, particularly monarchs, in various
ways.4 First was the scandalum magnatum (1275), which in modern parlance
prohibited spreading ‘fake news’ about the monarch or senior office holders.
Secondly, Parliament legislated Treason Act 1351 (UK) (25 Edw 3 Stat 5, c 2).
Treason involved three types of wrongdoing: (a) levying war against the
monarch; (b) ‘adhering’ to the king’s enemies; and (c) compassing or
‘imagining’ the death of the monarch. Regarding (c), initially speech in itself
could not suffice. An overt act was also required. Over time, this requirement
was relaxed, broadening the scope of the offence. Usually, the threat of
prosecution was used to discourage undesired behaviour, though some were
prosecuted. One example was Twyn, who printed a book suggesting the
monarch should be accountable to their subjects. He was executed for his
blatantly democratic views. Sometimes treason mixed with religion, given the
monarch as head of the state church. It became treasonous to publish a papal
bull, or ‘reconcile the Queen’s subjects to the see of Rome’. Ecclesiastical
courts would pursue prosecutions for blasphemy and heresy, enforcing
orthodoxy.
Despite the threatening nature of the offence, prosecutions were limited in
number. The main sticking point was the requirement to prove the material
was treasonous, and had been published. It could be difficult for the state to get
the warrant needed to obtain evidence supporting their allegations. The
Treason Trials Act 1696 (UK) accorded suspects due process protections.
William Caxton introduced a system of printing in 1476. Initially the
number of printers was small, but this grew exponentially during the
following century. This concerned the government, because it increased the
likelihood material critical of the government could circulate widely. As a
result, the Crown began to assert control over what was printed. Initially this
was in the form of benevolent copyright, under which the government would
recognise ownership rights in the creator of the work. However, the system
morphed into one of censorship,5 where copyright protection was a proxy for
government approval of material. During Elizabeth I’s reign, the Star
Chamber expressly limited the number of permitted printers, and required all
material sought to be published to be first approved by the Archbishop of
Canterbury or the Bishop of London.6
Difficulties with prosecutions for scandalum magnatum and treason led to
development of the common law offence of seditious libel in the 1606 Star
Chamber decision De Libellis Famosis.7 That Chamber was an attractive
forum for the state in these matters, because it lacked the due process
protections applicable in the common law courts for treason trials. Its
members belonged to the King’s Council and served at the monarch’s
4 Graham McBain, ‘Abolishing the crime of sedition: Part 1’ (2008) 82 Australian Law
Journal 543; Graham McBain, ‘Abolishing the crime of sedition: Part 2’ (2009) 83
Australian Law Journal 449.
5 W R Vance, ‘Freedom of Speech and of the Press’ (1918) 2 Minnesota Law Review 239, 244.
6 Philip Hamburger, ‘The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the
Press’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 661, 672.
7 (1606) 5 Co Rep 125a; 77 ER 250.
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pleasure. The kind of judicial independence we today take for granted was not
a feature of the judiciary.
In that case, the accused admitted publicly ridiculing members of the clergy.
The Chamber noted the supposed perils of criticism of public figures, on the
basis it would engender disrespect. It could be seen as a criticism of the
monarch who appointed them. Thus, the common law offence of seditious
libel should be recognised. It required proof that: (a) material was ‘seditious’
— inherently subjective, but broadly involved criticism of government;8 (b)
the author had seditious intent in writing it, which could be implied; and (c)
the material had been published. Truth was no defence. Those publicly
criticising the government were successfully prosecuted.9 Sir Francis Bacon
noted the chilling effect of the threat of punishment for seditious libel.10 Like
treason, such threat was the most significant impact of the provision, though
prosecutions occurred.
The early 17th century regime of James I was unlikely to encourage dissent.
He claimed to govern by divine right, and believed himself above the law.11
Not surprisingly, during his regime prosecutions for seditious libel increased.
Abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641 effected some change to this position.
It had been enforcing the restrictive licensing of printers. Its demise caused a
large increase in the volume of publications. The government still censored
material, requiring it to be approved prior to publication. This system of ‘prior
restraint’ finally lapsed in 1694.
The story of protection of criticism of government is connected with
activity in Parliament. When members asserted customary right to freedom of
speech in the 16th–17th centuries, they met with substantial resistance.
Historian Maitland records it was in 1521 the Speaker of English Parliament
first announced freedom of speech existed in Parliament as an ancient right.12
Elizabeth I disagreed, seeking to curb parliamentarians’ right to speak about
royal succession and religious matters. James I’s ascension caused relations
between the Parliament and monarch to deteriorate substantially. He believed
Parliament could only discuss what he wanted them to discuss. When
parliamentarians went on official record espousing their right to discuss what
8 Leonard W Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American
History (Bellknap Press, 1960) 10: ‘any comment about the government which could be
construed to have the bad tendency of lowering it in the public’s esteem or of disturbing the
peace was seditious libel, subjecting the speaker or writer to criminal prosecution’.
9 R v Chambers (1629) 3 St Tr 373, where a businessman was successfully prosecuted for
criticising government commerce regulation.
10 Reflecting on one offender’s punishment, he lamented that:
[it] was a matter of great terror among all the King’s servants and subjects; in somuch
as no man almost thought himself secure, and men durst scarce commune or talk one
with another, but there was special diffidence everywhere, which nevertheless made the
King rather more absolute than more safe. For bleeding inwards and shut vapours
strangle soonest, and oppress most.
Brian Vickers (ed), History of the Reign of King Henry VII and Selected Works (Cambridge
University Press, 1992) 115.
11 ‘The King ... cannot do a wrong’: Case of the Master and Fellows of Magdalen College in
Cambridge (1615) 11 Co Rep 66b, 72a; 77 ER 1235, 1243 (Lord Coke).
12 F W Maitland, The Constitutional History of England — A Course of Lectures Delivered
(Cambridge University Press, 1908) 242; David Colclough, Freedom of Speech in Early
Stuart England (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 137.
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they wanted, he tore the relevant page out. He imprisoned parliamentarians
regarded as disloyal, including Coke. After various suspensions of Parliament,
regicide, and several years of a republic, the Glorious Revolution of 1688
established Parliament’s dominance over the monarch. The Bill of Rights 1689
(UK) established the right of parliamentarians to speak.
This right was not extended to the public, and prosecutions for seditious
libel increased. Judges, still not wholly independent, relaxed former
requirements to successfully prosecute seditious libel. For instance, in R v
Beare13 the accused was successfully prosecuted, though there was no
evidence the accused had published the allegedly seditious poems, or intended
to do so. According to the law then, he should have been acquitted. However
the court, led by Holt CJ, decided these facts no longer prohibited conviction.
He justified this on the ‘principle of the preservation of all government, and
safety of all civil society: and if it should be no crime to write libels, the
government and the magistrates must be exposed to the malice and discontents
of disaffected persons’.14
Again in the successful prosecution of Tuchin for seditious libel for
criticising the government, Holt CJ explained:
it is a very strange doctrine, to say, it is not a libel, reflecting on the government ...
if men should not be called to account for possessing the people, with an ill opinion
of the government, no government can subsist, for it is very necessary for every
government, that the people should have a good opinion of it. And nothing can be
worse to any government than to endeavour to procure animosities as to the
management of it. This has been always looked upon as a crime, and no government
can be safe unless it is punished.15
While the government did not revert to ‘prior restraint’ of proposed speech,
Queen Anne’s government imposed a tax on all newspapers and
advertisements. The United States Supreme Court found this measure was
designed to deter criticism of government.16
While we laud free speech luminaries like Milton and Locke, neither
criticised the offence of sedition. Both expressed strong anti-Catholicism, and
would not support those expressing Catholic views. Leading legal
commentator Blackstone hardly espoused a strong defence of freedom of
speech:
liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists
in laying on previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom
of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his own temerity ... to punish ... any dangerous or offensive
writing which [are] ... of a pernicious tendency is necessary [to] preserv[e] ... peace
and good order.17
13 (1698) 1 Ld Raym 414; 91 ER 1175.
14 Holt CJ, quoted in Hamburger, above n 6, 732.
15 Tuchin (1704) Holt KB 424, 424–5; 90 ER 1133, 1133–4 (Holt CJ).
16 Grosjean v American Press Co Inc, 297 US 223, 246 (Sutherland J) (1936).
17 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England — A Facsimile of the First
Edition of 1765–1769 (University of Chicago Press, 1979) vol IV, 151–2.
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However, during this period society’s view of governance was changing.
Hamburger tracks this to differences in political thought, between
conservative government and Whig governments. Broadly, because
conservative governments strongly sought to protect current hierarchy, dissent
and criticism was dangerous, and needed to be put down. Sedition laws were
vigorously applied. However, as the Whigs took power, prosecutions
decreased. Hamburger writes:
In 1710 the idea of vigorous criticism of authority was as disturbing to most Tories
as it may have been congenial to a small number of radical Whigs ... committed to
a vision of hierarchical society established by divine authority and therefore
unimprovable, unchanging and uniform, Tory ideologues in ... 1710 perceived no
alternative to the received religious and political establishment ... the slightest
dissent posed a danger, and printed criticism of the government was no exception ...
by 1720 many men began to realize that ministers and factions, with all their petty
squabbles and scurrilous printed attacks on one another, would come and go, but the
English Establishment, a Protestant parliamentary monarchy, would be secure in
spite of all the liberties taken by the press ... accordingly although the Whig
government continued to prosecute printers for seditious libel after 1714, it did so
without expecting to bring the press to complete submission.18
Here a shift in political philosophy is observed, away from Hobbesian
all-powerful sovereign with unquestioned power,19 towards Lockean20
representative government with government as agent and servant of the
people. Obviously, the right to criticise the government is more compatible
with Lockean view of government than Hobbesian.21
Other pivotal developments in the 18th century include publication of Cato’s
Letters by prominent Whigs, advocating the importance of free speech in
democracy.22 The successful prosecution of Wilkes for sedition for
anti-government statements, his jailing for 2 years,23 and successful
prosecution of Thomas Paine for Rights of Man were contentious.24 Palmer
breached anti-sedition legislation in 1793 for daring to suggest universal
18 Hamburger, above n 6, 748–52.
19 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiaticall and Civil (1651).
20 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, first published
1690, 1960 ed) 150: ‘the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving
themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever
they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and
properties of the subject’.
21 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (MacMillan, 1883)
vol 2, 299–300. He adds ‘that the practical enforcement of this doctrine (of sedition) was
wholly inconsistent with any serious public discussion of political affairs is obvious’: at vol
2, 348.
22 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters; or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and
Religious, and Other Important Subjects (J Walthoe, T and T Longman, 6th ed, 1755) 96–100
(‘Cato’s Letter No 15 Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same is Inseparable from Publick
Liberty’): ‘without freedom of thought there can be no such thing as wisdom, and no such
thing as public liberty, without freedom of speech’, ‘whosoever would overthrow the liberty
of the nation, must begin by subduing the freedom of speech’, ‘freedom of speech is the
great bulwark of liberty; they prosper and die together’.
23 R v Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2577, 2561; 98 ER 327, 346.
24 R v Paine (1792) 22 St Tr 357; Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to
Mr Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution (J S Jordan, 1791) (‘Rights of Man’).
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suffrage, and was transported to Australia for 7 years for attempted ‘total
subversion of the constitution’.25 In the early 19th century when paranoia
about Napoleon was highest, Drakard was convicted for questioning the
practice of flogging in military ranks.26 The judge suggested the accused had
sought to weaken the British army, by reducing those wishing to enlist. He
denied anyone had the right to ‘make the people dissatisfied with the
government ... this is not to be permitted to any man, — it is unconstitutional
and seditious’.27 Yet prosecution for seditious libel had ‘practically ceased’
within 20 years.28 In 1843 Libel Act 1843 (UK) (‘Lord Campbell’s Act’) made
truth a defence to libel actions. By 1868, the courts lauded freedom of speech
as a fundamental constitutional value.29
Freedom of speech, including the right to criticise government, is best seen
in the common law as a negative liberty, in that it exists so far as, and to the
extent that, it is not abrogated by legislation.30 This is supported by the
principle of legality; where legislation is ambiguous, it will be interpreted to
not abrogate fundamental common law rights like freedom of speech.31 The
United Kingdom system of governance reflects parliamentary supremacy,
where courts traditionally lack power to deem a law unconstitutional. This is
tempered by the United Kingdom’s accession to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘European
Convention on Human Rights’),32 art 10 of which protects freedom of
expression.
Regulation of sedition in the United States
From early times legislatures in the United States passed anti-seditious
legislation. Most notorious was the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 (US)
prohibiting a person from ‘writing, printing, uttering or publishing ... any
false, scandalous and malicious writings against the government of the United
States or the President with intent to defame ... or bring them into disrepute’.33
Punishment could include a fine of $2000 and 2 years’ jail. Ten were convicted
under it. There was no successful First Amendment challenge to it. In the early
19th century, when the court had not applied the First Amendment to state
25 Thomas Erskine May, The Constitutional History of England Since the Accession of George
Third 1760–1860 (Crosby and Nichols, 1863) vol II, 145, 148.
26 R v Drakard (1811) 31 How St Tr 495, 535 (Baron Wood).
27 Ibid.
28 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, above n 21, 373, states that prosecutions
for seditious libel had practically ceased by 1832; Zechariah Chafee, Jr, ‘Freedom of Speech
in War Time’ (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 932, 951: ‘liberalism triumphed in 1832’.
29 Wason v Walter (1868) LR 4 QB 73, 93 (Cockburn CJ).
30 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, 207 (Lord Steyn).
31 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 130
(Lord Steyn; Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreeing), 131 (Lord Hoffmann).
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953)
(‘European Convention on Human Rights’).
33 Sedition Act 1798 (US).
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laws, many states had anti-sedition legislation, using it to prosecute slavery
abolitionists. They were jailed for their anti-government statements.34
During World War I the Espionage Act 1917 (US) was passed, creating an
offence to make false statements intending to interfere with the war effort,
including inciting insurrection, mutiny or disloyalty among armed forces, or
obstructing recruitment. It was amended to preclude disloyal, profane,
scurrilous or abusive language about the American form of government.
Approximately 1000 individuals were convicted under the Act.35 Their
‘crimes’ often involved making anti-war statements. For that, they were jailed
for 10 years or more.36 It was unnecessary for the government to show the
defendant’s conduct had in fact impeded the war effort. For some years the
court accepted the validity of legislation prohibiting the making of statements
advocating violent overthrow of government. They were applied to
communists and communist sympathisers.37 Eventually, the court determined
such statements per se were protected by the First Amendment. The state’s
constitutional power to proscribe such speech was limited to cases where
speech was intended, and likely, to lead to imminent lawless behaviour.38 It
recognised the incompatibility of most iterations of sedition law with free
speech.39 American free speech doctrine virtually prohibits viewpoint and
content discrimination:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
If there any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.40
Prosecutions for sedition in Australia
Sedition first entered the criminal law federally in Australia in 1920, and
became prominent during41 and after World War II, including the period of
communist hysteria in the late 1940s to early 1950s. The Commonwealth
attempted to outlaw the Communist Party of Australia, and then sought a
change to the Constitution via referendum to give them power over it when
Plan A foundered in the High Court.42 There is a long association between
34 Norman Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel
(University of North Carolina Press, 1986) 108–20; Levy, above n 8, 204–12.
35 Stewart Jay, ‘The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the
Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century’ (2008) 34 William Mitchell Law Review
773.
36 Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919); Schenck v United States, 249 US 47 (1919);
Chafee, above n 28, 965.
37 Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925); Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927); Dennis v
United States, 341 US 494 (1951).
38 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969).
39 Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 598 (1967): ‘dangers fatal to First Amendment
freedoms inhere in the word “seditious”’ (Brennan J).
40 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson J;
Black, Douglas and Murphy JJ concurring).
41 National Security Act 1939 (Cth) and National Security (General) Regulations 1939 (Cth);
Roger Douglas, ‘Law, War and Liberty: The World War II Subversive Prosecutions’ (2003)
27 Melbourne University Law Review 65.
42 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
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sedition laws and anti-communism, with suggestions the laws were originally
introduced federally in response to feared repercussions from the Russian
Revolution of 1917.43 Since inception,44 anti-sedition laws have been applied
in a highly politically selective manner.45
The two landmark sedition cases in Australia are Burns v Ransley46 and R v
Sharkey.47 Both occurred in 1949 at the start of the Cold War, and concerned
s 24 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), as it then was. Section 24D stated any
person who writes, prints, utters or publishes any ‘seditious words’ is guilty of
an indictable offence. Section 24B stated seditious words were those
expressing seditious intention. Section 24A stated expression in any of the
following circumstances was evidence of seditious intention: attempt to excite
dissatisfaction against the sovereign, government or constitution of the United
Kingdom, excite disaffection against the Australian Government, Constitution
or either House of Parliament, or promote feelings of ill-will and hostility
between classes of subject so as to endanger the peace, order and good
government of the Commonwealth. A defence applied if the accused could
show they had been attempting in good faith to show the sovereign had been
mistaken, point out in good faith government errors, attempt by lawful means
to secure alteration of the law in Australia, or point out in good faith any
matters ‘producing or tending to produce feelings of ill-will and hostility’
among Her Majesty’s subjects.
In Burns v Ransley, Burns was a participant at a public debate in Brisbane
after World War II. He represented the Australian Communist Party. He was
asked, in the event of a third world war pitting Russia against Western powers,
what the attitude and approach of the Party would be. He replied the
communists would oppose the war. Upon being pressed, he indicated the
Communist Party would side with Russia. He was charged with sedition under
s 24D.
At the time, the High Court has not discerned the Australian Constitution
contained an implied freedom of political communication. This only occurred
in 1992.48 Thus, the Court did not consider, in terms of constitutional issues,
43 Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in
Australia, Report No 104 (2006) 55 (‘Fighting Words’).
44 McBain, ‘Part 2’, above n 4, 479–80:
the heart of the offence (is) punishment by the ruling class of opinions inimical to its
own; using the mechanism of the courts. Sedition was a useful political weapon to protect
the status quo, whether this be the supremacy of the monarch, the established church or
the government in power. Of uncertain origin, impossible to define, vague in ambit,
prosecutions were invariably prompted by political considerations.
45 Laurence W Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 287,
303–4; see also 300: ‘the decision (to prosecute Burns) was intended to secure a political
advantage for the Commonwealth Government’; Fighting Words, above n 43, 62 [2.53]:
‘sedition is a quintessentially political crime, in that this offence has been used to criminalise
expression that is critical of the established order’; Michael Head, ‘The Political Uses and
Abuses of Sedition: The Trial of Brian Cooper’ (2007) 11 Legal History 63, 64: ‘decisions
were taken to launch ... sedition prosecutions, which required the approval of the
Attorney-General, for purely political purposes’.
46 (1949) 79 CLR 101.
47 (1949) 79 CLR 121.
48 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
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whether the law infringed Burns’ right to discuss political matters. The
(statutory) majority found the words he used expressed seditious intent,
encouraging disloyalty to Australia.49 It was held unnecessary for a successful
prosecution to show the accused subjectively intended insurrection etc; it was
sufficient the words used could objectively be interpreted that way. It also
found the law was constitutionally valid, supported by the Commonwealth’s
power to enact laws incidental to other heads of power. The Court stated it was
normal for states to have power to prevent and punish subversive activity.50
The comments concerned went beyond mere political discussion.51 They
interpreted disaffection to mean hostility, estranged allegiance, or disloyalty,
and excite to mean inspire, infect or inflame disaffection.52 The two dissenting
justices disagreed the accused had the required objective of inciting
disaffection against the government.53 They interpreted intention subjectively.
In R v Sharkey,54 a newspaper reporter interviewed Mr Sharkey, the General
Secretary of the Communist Party in Australia. The reporter asked him what
the position of the Communist Party would be if Australia were invaded by
communists. He replied if communist forces entered Australia ‘in pursuit of
aggressors’, Australian workers would welcome them, as workers in Europe
had welcomed arrival of the Soviet Union to liberate them from Nazi rule.
Mr Sharkey opined the Soviet Union would only engage in war if it were
attacked, and it was unlikely their forces would invade Australia. He said
communist policy was to prevent war and educate people to disfavour it. He
said the Communist Party wanted to bring the working class to power, and if
‘fascists’ in Australia sought to use force to prevent workers gaining access to
that power, the Communist Party would advise workers to ‘meet force with
force’. The words appeared in a newspaper, and Mr Sharkey was charged with
sedition. He was convicted by jury and appealed to the High Court. When an
appeal goes to the High Court against findings of fact of a jury, the Court is
not to make the decision itself anew, but determine whether there could have
been a reasonable basis for the jury’s findings.
All members of the Court found it was open for the jury to interpret
Mr Sharkey’s words as more than a prediction about how Australian workers
would react; that in fact it represented an urging that workers should welcome
Soviet troops if they arrived. It could be read as recommending disloyalty to
Australia and exciting disaffection to the country, under cover of commenting
about the likelihood of an invasion.55 Dixon J confirmed the Commonwealth
had constitutional power to punish any utterance or publication which
‘aroused resistance to the law or which excited insurrection against the
Commonwealth, likely to cause discontent with and opposition to the
enforcement of federal law or the operations of the federal government’.56 He
49 Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101, 109 (Latham CJ), 112 (Rich J).
50 Ibid 110 (Latham CJ).
51 Ibid 109 (Latham CJ), 111 (Rich J).
52 Ibid 109 (Latham CJ), 112 (Rich J).
53 Ibid 118 (Dixon J), 120 (McTiernan J).
54 (1949) 79 CLR 121.
55 Ibid 140–1 (Latham CJ), 145 (Rich J).
56 Ibid 148 (Dixon J).
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agreed obedience was important for the effective working of government.57
He would not disturb the jury’s finding the words used carried seditious intent.
Other members agreed Mr Sharkey’s words carried seditious overtones.58 The
decisions have been criticised.59 A later case noted a prima facie case of
sedition because the accused strongly suggested violence, but the court did not
equivocally find the offence required this be proven, just that it existed on the
facts, so reasonable evidence of the offence having been committed existed.60
Current sedition offences in Australian law
Section 52 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) makes it an offence for a
person to conspire with another to engage in a seditious enterprise, or
advisedly publish seditious words or writing. The maximum penalty for a
person convicted is 3 years’ jail, or 7 years for a second/subsequent offence.
Seditious words are those uttered with a seditious intention, and a seditious
enterprise is formed to execute seditious intention. Section 44 defines
seditious intention as an intention to effect any of the following purposes:
(a) bring the sovereign into hatred or contempt;
(b) excite disaffection against the sovereign or government of the United
Kingdom or Queensland, against Houses of Parliament of the United
Kingdom or Queensland Legislative Assembly, or administration of
justice;
(c) excite individuals to agitate for change to law other than by lawful
means;
(d) raise discontent or disaffection among the monarch’s subjects; or
(e) promote feelings of ill-will and enmity between different classes of
the monarch’s subjects.
This definition was taken from Stephen’s 1887 A Digest of Criminal Law
(Crimes and Punishments).61 This definition gives less scope for freedom of
speech than alternatives.62 It was a feature of the State’s Criminal Code Act
57 Ibid.
58 McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ.
59 Laurence W Maher, ‘Dissent, Disloyalty and Disaffection: Australia’s Last Cold War
Sedition Case’ (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 1, 17: ‘the High Court had, very unwisely,
interpreted the sedition provisions of the Act in a way that enabled the Act to be used to
punish expressions of “disloyalty”. At the time the concept of loyalty was defined in terms
of an enforced rigid anti-communist political orthodoxy’; Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of
Sedition’, above n 45, 309:
in none of the sedition cases (during) 1948–1953 was there any evidence of an actual
(that is, subjective) seditious intention of the types referred to in (then) s 24A of the
Crimes Act 1914. Nor was there the slightest ... evidence that the words used by any ...
defendant was intended to provoke violence or public disorder or that the words in fact
created any immediate threat of that kind.
60 Cooper v The Queen (1961) 105 CLR 177, 185 (Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto, Menzies and
Windeyer JJ).
61 James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)
(MacMillan, 4th ed, 1887).
62 Simon Pickering, ‘“A Voice in the Wilderness”: Revisiting the Trial of Brian Cooper’ (2016)
35 University of Queensland Law Journal 371, 383.
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1899 at inception.63 It is said Stephen required the conduct to include
incitement to violence,64 as laid down by cases such as R v Collins.65
However, none of the purposes stated refer to a requirement that the accused
commit violence or breach the peace, so if this were part of Stephen’s model,
it was ‘lost in transplantation’ to the colonies. The other states received the
United Kingdom common law of sedition;66 under these laws various
important individuals and events in Australian history were associated with
prosecutions.67 A good faith defence is provided in s 45.68 Similar provisions
exist in Western Australia,69 Tasmania,70 and Northern Territory.71
The previous Commonwealth sedition provisions were removed in 2010
after a recommendation by the Australian Law Reform Commission.72 In their
place, s 80.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) was legislated. It creates an
offence to intentionally urge another to overthrow by force or violence the
Australian Constitution, federal or state governments, or lawful authority of
the Commonwealth Government. This is punishable by maximum 7-year jail
term. Section 80.1AC provides an offence of treachery, where a person
actually engages in conduct involving use of force or violence, intending to
overthrow the Australian Constitution, federal or state governments, or lawful
authority of the Commonwealth Government. This is punishable by a
maximum life jail term.73
The United Kingdom retains anti-sedition legislation in the Incitement to
Disaffection Act 1934 (UK). Section 1 creates an offence if a person
maliciously endeavours to seduce a member of the defence force from their
duty. A woman was prosecuted for breach of this provision, for circulating
anti-war pamphlets to serving soldiers detailing where they could go if they
63 Some voiced concern over the breadth of the proposed provision and its likely impact on
‘radicalism and republicanism’: ibid 384.
64 McBain, ‘Part 2’, above n 4, 468: ‘Stephen was also clear that for the modern offence to
exist there must be an incitement to violence as laid down in Collins’.
65 (1839) 3 St Tr (NS) 1149.
66 See Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) s 35(1), contemplating prosecutions for
seditious libel; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 316(2)(a)(i) referring to seditious enterprises,
relying on common law definition of sedition.
67 They include prosecution of John Macarthur for sedition against Governor Bligh,
Governor Darling’s press critics, the Ballarat Times editor during the Eureka Stockade, and
anti-conscriptionists during World War I: Fighting Words, above n 43, 53.
68 A defence applies where an accused points out in good faith sovereign’s mistakes, points out
in good faith defects in the government or constitution of the United Kingdom or
Queensland with a view to reform, attempting to change the law by lawful means, and points
out with a view to remedy existing points of contention and unhappiness among individuals.
69 Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) ss 44–52.
70 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 66–7. Section 68 creates an offence of degrading, reviling
or exposing to hatred or contempt people or a government of any foreign state, except fair
comment. Section 62 prohibits encouraging traitorous conduct. The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
s 12 prohibits acts which ‘compass, imagine, invent, devise or intends to deprive’ the
monarch or her heirs and successors from the style, honour or royal name, compel her to
change her measures or counsels, or put any force or restraint on to intimidate the Parliament
of the United Kingdom or New South Wales, and attempt to make these things happen by
uttering or printing words.
71 Criminal Code Act 1993 (NT) ss 44–6. The common law offence of sedition was abolished
in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory.
72 Fighting Words, above n 43, 84.
73 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 24AA.
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wished to desert. Her free speech defence was rejected.74 Otherwise, sedition
was and remains a common law, rather than statutory, offence.75 Seditious
intention alone is not sufficient to commit the offence; intent to incite violence
is also required.
Implied freedom of political communication
In landmark decisions in 1992, the High Court implied in the Australian
Constitution a freedom of political communication.76 This was based on
notions of representative government reflected in the Constitution, including
ss 7 and 24 providing for direct election of members of the Senate and House
of Representatives respectively. The Court has explained it is necessary in a
functioning democracy there be full and robust debate about issues.
Candidates for political office must be able to communicate with voters.
Voters must have access to a broad range of information to make an informed
decision about their vote, and discuss political issues among themselves. The
implied freedom has led to various laws being invalidated, including
restrictions on political advertising, prohibition of criticism of government
bodies, bans on political donations, and anti-protest laws.
The High Court has observed the implied freedom is narrower in Australia
than its counterpart in the United States. This is important, since the High
Court clearly drew on American jurisprudence in discerning the freedom, and
has continued to use American precedents in outlining its contours.
Specifically, it is narrower than the First Amendment in being confined to
communication with a ‘political’ flavour. This distinguishes it from protection
of freedom of expression in other human rights instruments; the freedom is not
similarly confined in the United States,77 Canada,78 Europe79 or New
Zealand.80 It is not clear, in policy terms, why the freedom should be so
confined in Australia. Further, it is a negative right, a shield protecting it from
interference from statute or common law. It is not a positive right, in the sense
it could found a legal action for breach, and damages.
Like the United States precedents,81 Australian precedents have determined
a difference between laws prohibiting or regulating speech based on content
(content-based regulation), and laws regulating speech not based on content.82
74 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978) 3 EHRR 218.
75 R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 QB 429.
76 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
77 United States Constitution amend I.
78 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I s 2(b) (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’).
79 European Convention on Human Rights art 10(1).
80 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 14.
81 Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95–6 (Marshall J) (1972):
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content ... any
restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open.
82 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 143
(Mason CJ), 234–5 (McHugh J); Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555 [95] (Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
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Laws of the former kind are more difficult to justify. In contrast, where the
laws are aimed at a legitimate objective unrelated to suppression of speech,
and the effect on speech incidental rather than the direct purpose of the laws,
they are more likely valid.
The approach to determining whether a law infringes the implied freedom
has evolved. For some years, a two-stage test was applied.83 Now a majority
of the High Court has adopted a three-stage test.84 That test considers the
following questions to determine whether a law is valid:
(a) whether the law effectively burdens freedom of communication
about government or political matters in terms, operation or effect;
(b) whether the purpose of the law and the means adopted to achieve it
are legitimate, compatible with maintenance of the
constitutionally-prescribed system of representative government; and
(c) whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve that
legitimate objective (proportionality testing). Under proportionality
testing, the court considers whether the challenged measures are
suitable, necessary and adequate in their balance. They are suitable if
rationally connected to their purpose. They are necessary if no
obvious and compelling reasonable practical alternative exists to
achieve the legitimate objective, and may be adequate in their
balance having regard to their infringement of the fundamental
freedom, compared with the legitimate objective/s sought.
The High Court has not considered the implied freedom in the context of a
sedition-type offence. The closest equivalent involved laws making it an
offence to bring the Industrial Relations Commission into disrepute. Several
members of the Court decided such a law invalid because it infringed the
implied freedom of political communication.85 Later some members found the
implied freedom engaged when an individual circulated written material
accusing police officers of corruption.86 The High Court has accepted protest
directly engages the implied freedom of political communication, validating
laws restricting protest that were reasonable for public safety,87 but
invalidating anti-protest laws that were vague and overbroad.88 I will now
consider whether the state anti-sedition laws (exemplified in the Queensland
Criminal Code Act 1899) and federal anti-sedition laws are likely to be held
constitutionally valid if challenged. The implied freedom applies to federal
and state laws.89
83 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
84 McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178.
85 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 53 (Brennan J), 79–80 (Deane and
Toohey JJ).
86 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 30 [25]ff (Gleeson CJ), 45 [80]–[81] (McHugh J), 78
[197]ff (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 100 [261]ff (Kirby J); contra 113 [299] (Callinan J), 120
[318]ff (Heydon J).
87 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579.
88 Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328.
89 Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530.
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Constitutional validity of state anti-sedition laws
As noted, current legislation in several states criminalises sedition. This
legislation defines sedition broadly, including bringing the sovereign into
hatred or contempt, exciting disaffection against the sovereign of the United
Kingdom or state, against parliaments in the former country or state, or the
administration of justice, or raise discontent or disaffection among citizens, or
promote feelings of ill-will between individuals.
The first observation is the very broad possible ambit of such an offence.
Consider a person who is an avowed republican. They may espouse strident
views in favour of a republican form of government, and in so doing disparage
members of the monarchy. On one view, this disparagement could bring the
sovereign into contempt or hatred.
In relation to exciting disaffection against the government, and raising
discontent or disaffection among citizens, on one view this is what opposition
members of Parliament regularly do. They often oppose government action
and criticise government policy. Sometimes the opposition and criticism is for
genuine policy different reasons; however, sometimes the opposition seems to
be for the sake of opposition; the opposition is not seeking to make a good
faith contribution to society in order to improve the situation, but constantly
negative about anything a government does, to rouse public sentiment against
the government. Other political lobby groups may also work to excite
‘disaffection’ with the government. This may be designed to change policy, or
a cynical ploy to undermine the government, with a view to changing it.
Individuals may also work to do this. For example, an Australian
businessperson is currently running large advertisements in newspapers
suggesting we should cut the current immigration intake, because our youth
unemployment rate is high. The question of immigration levels is highly
charged and emotive. Is this advertiser seeking to ‘excite disaffection’ against
the government, or raise discontent among citizens? On one view, he is. He
suggests Australia’s youth unemployment rate is caused by high immigration
levels. That would rankle with current unemployed people, their families, and
others. On another view, this is a contribution to an important public policy
debate that all countries, including Australia, have and should have regarding
optimal immigration levels.
In relation to ‘promoting feelings of ill-will’, many public commentators do
this. Some radio and television broadcasters take a particularly aggressive
tone. It has been suggested some members of the media adopted an aggressive
strategy to have Australia’s previous Prime Minister removed. A radio
broadcaster has recently been found to have committed defamation by falsely
accusing individuals who owned a dam of causing the death of numerous
flood victims. Accusing someone of causing the death of others is likely to
promote feelings of ill-will between individuals.
Some might defend the validity of the state legislation by pointing to the
good faith defence. Broadly, it is a defence to prosecution for sedition to show
the accused raised matters in good faith relating to mistakes the monarch
made, defects in governance with a view to reform, and point out with a view
to correction things causing ill-will and discord among society.
This defence is not sufficient to protect legitimate speech. For instance, an
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arch republican may stridently criticise the monarchy. This may not be with a
view to pointing out ‘mistakes’, but with a view to abandoning the monarchy.
Much criticism of government is not designed to point to defects in
government with a view to reform; rather it is to pursue an agenda of regime
change or change of policy direction. Some participants in public debate
might point to issues causing ill-will and discord among the community, but
not with a view to correction. The person may cynically play on public discord
for their own ends, or may have personal animosity towards the government
or its members. In other words, the existing good faith defence is not broad
enough to protect the kinds of speech that should be permitted in a robust
democracy like Australia.
In terms of the three-stage test for determining whether laws are compatible
with the implied freedom, the first question is whether the law burdens
freedom of communication about government or political matters in terms,
operation or effect. Clearly it does — discussion about the head of state,
Parliament and government is clearly about political matters. The second
question is whether the purpose of the law and the means adopted to achieve
it are legitimate, being compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system
of representative government. The purpose of the law will have to be guessed
at. It is a section contained in Criminal Code Act 1899 since inception, and
there has been no alteration to the definition of seditious intention since. The
second reading speech introducing the Code to Parliament did not specifically
refer to the sedition section, thus we have no specific evidence about its
purpose.
Presumably, the purpose of the law was to prevent uprising and revolution
against the established system of government and constitutional structure. It
was believed if individuals were permitted to foment discontent about the
status quo, this might cause civil unrest and discord, and destruction of the
stable structures that had largely been imported from the United Kingdom for
the colony’s governance. A breach of the peace might result. Looking at the
section through the eyes of today, one may doubt whether the purpose of the
law and the means used are in fact compatible with representative
government. Representative government implies individuals must be free to
speak their mind about political matters, including how they are governed. If
they are not happy with the current monarch, or the constitution or members
of the Parliament, they should have a right to say so without fear of being
prosecuted for fomenting ill-will against established order.
The definition of seditious intention is not confined to cases where the
accused uses or threatens violence to attain their ends. Only one of the five
examples of seditious intent refers to use of unlawful means. That example
might be more justified as consistent with representative government, in that
citizens are expected to comply with the law, and use lawful channels,
including talking with their representative or themselves standing for office, if
they wish to change the law. A law seeking to confine dissent to lawful means
might have a legitimate purpose. In contrast, laws simply preventing a person
exciting disaffection with the current governance or promoting ill-will among
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citizens may not, because they prevent the robust public debate upon which
representative government depends.90
At the third stage, the court considers whether the law is reasonably
appropriate and adapted to a legitimate objective. It considers whether the law
is suitable (rationally connected to its purpose), necessary (no alternative less
invasive of human rights practically available to meet the legitimate
objective), and adequate in its balance. If it were accepted suppression of
dissent and criticism is a legitimate objective, it might be argued the law is
suitable to that end. However, it is unlikely to be necessary. There are many
ways to ensure maintenance of existing governance structures without
criminalising dissent and criticism. Arguably, if there is a place for sedition
laws in a modern democracy, they should be limited to circumstances where
the relevant conduct was likely to lead to immediate breach of the peace
and/or cause danger to the public.
Indeed, this is the current position in Canada,91 the United States92 and
United Kingdom.93 The Australian High Court relied on Canadian cases,
particularly those prior to the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms there, when discerning the implied freedom in Australia.94
Thus, their precedents hold special relevance for Australia here. Such a
Canadian case concerned the validity of legislation proscribing seditious libel.
The section defined sedition as involving publication or circulation of written
material advocating use, without legal authority, of force to accomplish
government change in Canada. The section stated it was not intended to limit
the meaning of sedition. A defence was provided in very similar terms as the
state legislation in Australia. Difficulties arose because, historically, sedition
had sometimes been defined as involving mere intent to bring the sovereign or
government into hatred or contempt, or invite disaffection with them, and
sometimes defined to be merely promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility
between individuals. In both such iterations, there was no requirement of
intention to incite violence to secure government change. The issue was
whether the Canadian version of the sedition law should be interpreted
narrowly on its terms, confined to cases where the publisher or circulator of
the material intended it to lead to government change through violence, or
whether the broader view of sedition was part of Canadian law. The context
was an adherent of the Jehovah’s Witness religion who distributed pamphlets.
They contained statements calling for calm and reason. They discussed
victimisation and persecution of Witnesses, and called for a closer reading of
God’s word.
A majority of the Court interpreted the sedition offence in Canada as limited
90 McBain, ‘Part 2’, above n 4, 480: ‘the absence of the offence (of sedition) demonstrates a
healthy democracy’.
91 Boucher v The King [1951] SCR 265.
92 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969); Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951).
93 R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 QB 429, 453.
A change occurred in R v Collins (1839) 3 St Tr (NS) 1149, 1176: Littledale J defined
seditious writing as one suggesting ‘the people should make use of physical force as their
own resource to obtain justice’, as opposed to mere criticism.
94 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 141
(Mason CJ); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 49–50 (Brennan J), 74
(Deane and Toohey JJ), 103 (McHugh J).
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to when the accused intended to bring about government change through
force. Rand J tied the changing conception of sedition with changes in how
government was viewed. When government was seen as comprising superior
beings exercising a divine mandate, and a Hobbesian view of human nature
taken, a broad conception of sedition, and strong legal prohibition against
criticism of government action, was expected. With the growth of
representative government and acceptance that the people were sovereign,
criticism of government action became more acceptable.95
Rand J said legal historian Stephen had defined seditious as involving any
of the following: (a) bringing into hatred or contempt, or exciting disaffection
against, the monarch or government or constitution of the United Kingdom,
either House of Parliament, or administration of justice; (b) excite the
monarch’s subjects, other than through lawful means, to alter any law;
(c) incite any person to commit a crime in disturbance of the peace; (d) raise
discontent or disaffection amongst citizens; or (e) promote feelings of ill-will
or hostility between different classes of subjects.96 This is like definitions in
existing state laws in Australia.
Rand J distinguished historical practice evidenced by Stephen with current
realities (in 1954). He concluded no modern authority had included within the
concept of sedition the mere fact a person creating discontent or disaffection
among citizens, without the further element of inciting illegal conduct. He was
not surprised by this because:
Freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every
conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life. The clash of critical discussion on
political, social and religious subjects has too deeply become the stuff of daily
experience to suggest that mere ill-will as a product of controversy can strike down
the latter with illegality ... our compact of free society accepts and absorbs ...
differences and they are exercised at large within the framework of freedom and
order on broader and deeper uniformities as bases of social stability. Similarly in
discontent, affection and hostility: as subjective incidents of controversy, they and
the ideas which arouse them are part of our living which ultimately serve us in
stimulation, in the clarification of thought and ... in the search for the constitution
and truth of things generally.97
Locke J said it was ‘very much too late in the day’ to say that it was a crime
for a person to publish something calculated to alienate the affections of
people by bringing the government into disrepute or ridicule.98
Of course, if the Australian courts were to apply these sentiments, the state
laws would be invalid, at least partly. They do not require that the accused
95 Boucher v The King [1951] SCR 265, 285–6.
96 Ibid 287.
97 Ibid 288 (Rand J), 330 (Locke J). Similar comments appear in Dickson J (for Spence and
Estey JJ) in Cherneskey v Armadale Publishers Ltd [1979] 1 SCR 1067, 1096:
free and general discussion of public matters is fundamental to a democratic society. The
right of persons to make public their thoughts on the conduct of public officials ... goes
back to earliest times in Greece and Rome. The Roman historian, Tacitus, spoke of the
happiness of the times when one could think as he wished and could speak as he thought
... citizens, as decision makers, cannot be expected to exercise wise and informed
judgment unless ... exposed to the widest variety of ideas, from diverse and antagonistic
sources. Full disclosure exposes ... false doctrine.
98 Boucher v The King [1951] SCR 265, 331 (Locke J).
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incite unlawful conduct. Rand J erred by claiming in 1954 ‘no modern
authority’ had included within the offence of sedition the uttering of words
exciting disaffection without the accompanying requirement of incitement of
illegal conduct. His ignorance of the law of Australian states may be forgiven.
Evidently, Locke J was also unfamiliar with these laws. In any event, if
punishing non-violent expressions was seen as a relic of another era by
Canadian judges in 1954, their unfitness to be part of Australian statute law in
2019 is clearer.
In terms of necessity, Douglas explains the United Kingdom did not suffer
from its tolerant approach to dissenters during World War II. He points out
bans on speech and association usually do not prevent allegedly subversive
groups from continuing their activities. He suggests sedition laws are
essentially typically based on a false premise:
Anti-subversion legislation assumes that there are ideas which, once allowed into the
community, are likely to run rampant. Yet there was no evidence to suggest that the
major dissident groups possessed some mysterious capacity to seduce the populace.
Indeed their ongoing minority status was testimony to their ineffectiveness in this
regard.99
In sum, if anti-sedition laws ever were needed, they are no longer ‘necessary’
and they are not minimally invasive of freedom of communication.
Further, the laws are unlikely to be adequate in their balance. The ability to
discuss politics is essential in a democracy. In the United States and Europe,
where a broader range of speech is protected, both have recognised speech
about political matters/public affairs occupies the highest rung of free speech
protection.100 This goes to show how widespread is recognition within
democracies of the pivotal role of free speech in their healthy preservation.
Further, sedition restrictions are content-based. As indicated above, courts in
Australia and United States have been wary of laws regulating speech where
their application is based on content. According to Mason CJ in Australian
Capital Television, they require compelling justification. It is difficult to meet
this requirement in relation to the broadly-defined state sedition laws.
It is noteworthy that in Coleman v Power,101 two justices of the High Court
were only able to conclude a provision prohibiting the use of ‘insulting words’
was compatible with the constitutional implied freedom by reading the
provision down to be confined to words likely to provoke violence.102 There
are obvious analogies with the ill-defined notion of sedition.
State anti-sedition laws are unconstitutional in their infringement of the
implied freedom of political communication. The offence provisions burden
freedom of political communication. They are not compatible with
representative government. Even if they are, they fail proportionality testing,
because they are not necessary or adequate in their balance. If they were
99 Douglas, above n 41, 113. Further, in an internet era, the ability of any legislature to combat
subversive communications is highly suspect.
100 Snyder v Phelps, 562 US 443, 452 (Roberts CJ) (2011): ‘speech on public issues occupies
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, ... entitled to special
protection’; Oberschlick v Austria [No 2] (1997) 25 EHRR 357, [29].
101 (2004) 220 CLR 1.
102 Ibid 77–8 [193]–[196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ; Kirby J agreeing).
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narrowly tailored, confined to instances where the relevant speech was likely
to provoke a violent response, they are defensible. This possibility is discussed
below.
Constitutional validity of Commonwealth anti-sedition
laws
There is a key distinction between the offence of sedition as described at state
level, and the equivalent offence at federal level, as amended in 2010. The
2010 amendments removed the offence of sedition, replacing it with a new
offence in s 80.2 of urging overthrow of the government or Constitution with
violence. This amendment brought the Australian federal law into line with
what the court in Canada in the 1954 Boucher v The King case103 said was
required for sedition to be proven, namely that of incitement to an unlawful
act, typically violent. The question is whether the amended provision is
constitutionally valid, given the implied freedom of political communication.
On the three-step test, s 80.2 burdens freedom of communication about
political matters. Secondly, we consider whether the purpose of the law and
the means to achieve it are legitimate, compatible with representative
government. The purpose of the law is to discourage and put down urging of
violent insurrection. Such insurrection may well involve violence and injure
others. The government has a legitimate interest in preserving public order and
safety. The means to achieve it, preventing the urging of violent acts, are
legitimate and compatible with representative government. Representative
government implies changes to the law, and changes to government, occur
through the voting process. They occur through peaceful, democratic means,
not violent, undemocratic means. Prohibition of unlawful violence committed
to achieve political change is consistent with representative government.
On the third stage and proportionality analysis, the court considers whether
the law is suitable, necessary and adequate in its balance. The Commonwealth
law is suitable, as rationally connected towards a purpose of peaceful
resolution of disputes, discussion of issues, and change. It is necessary —
where an individual or group obtained power, or a transfer of power away
from a democratically elected government, through unlawful force, the new
government is illegitimate. It is at odds with representative government. It is
necessary to criminalise attempted action along these lines. The section is
adequate in its balance. Preservation of a democratically elected government
from violent overthrow is a pressing objective. The impact on freedom of
expression involved is minimal, having regard to that pressing objective. The
Commonwealth anti-sedition law is valid.
I am fortified in this conclusion upon considering First Amendment doctrine
in this type of case. It has been pointed out the Australian implied freedom
differs materially from the First Amendment. United States decisions are not
necessarily applicable in Australia, given these differences. Having said that,
many Australian cases have utilised doctrine from First Amendment
discussion, acknowledged or not. The first implied freedom cases referred to
103 [1950] 1 DLR 657 (Supreme Court of Canada).
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American authorities.104 The Australian court’s distinction between
content-based and content-neutral restrictions mirrors the distinction made in
the First Amendment jurisprudence. Gummow and Hayne JJ’s use of the
‘fighting words’ doctrine in the Australian Coleman v Power105 decision was
expressly linked with Chaplinsky v New Hampshire.106
The First Amendment case law is vast. Broadly, at one time the Supreme
Court upheld anti-sedition legislation, Espionage Act 1917, against First
Amendment challenge.107 In 1925, it validated a law on the basis the state was
entitled to criminalise speech that might endanger foundations of
government.108 At the start of the Cold War, legislation prohibiting advocacy
of overthrowing any government in the United States and organisations with
such aims was validated.109 Requirements for individuals to utter oaths loyal
to the nation as a condition of employment, or government benefits, were
upheld.110 Legislation prohibiting advocacy or teaching of violence to seek
political change was upheld.111
However, the Court moved away from these precedents. It struck down
laws that sought to criminalise peaceful association.112 It struck out loyalty
oaths.113 It overturned Whitney v California,114 deciding legislation
criminalising urging of criminal behaviour to achieve reform was invalid.
There in Brandenburg v Ohio, the Court insisted the only circumstances in
which such advocacy could be lawfully prohibited was when directed to
incitement or production of imminent lawless action, and was likely to so
achieve.115 This contrasted with mere abstract speech suggesting violence. On
the facts, the accused’s conviction was overturned. He was a leader of the
KKK. He suggested if the American President continued to ‘suppress the
white, Caucasian race’, ‘revengeance’ might be needed. The Court quashed
his conviction, concluding his speech was not directed or likely to cause
imminent lawless behaviour.
Broadly, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) has taken a
similar view. It quashed convictions of individuals who were highly critical of
the Turkish Government. They were prosecuted for publishing propaganda
said to undermine that state,116 and inciting hostility among groups.117 In both
the ECHR found infringement of art 10(1) of the European Convention on
104 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 143
(Mason CJ), 231, 241 (McHugh J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 31
(Mason CJ), 79 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 103 (McHugh J).
105 (2004) 220 CLR 1, 75–6 [187].
106 315 US 568 (1942).
107 Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919) (jailed for 10 years for an anti-war speech found
to be an attempt ‘to cause and incite subordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in
the military and naval forces of the United States’: at 212).
108 Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925).
109 Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951).
110 Garner v Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 US 716 (1951).
111 Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927).
112 DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353 (1937).
113 Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513 (1958).
114 274 US 357 (1927).
115 395 US 444 (1969).
116 Baskaya v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 10.
117 Ceylan v Turkey (2000) 30 EHRR 73
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Human Rights, and the measures not justified, because the speech was
unlikely to incite violence. Canadian Supreme Court also confine sedition to
cases where the relevant speech was likely to incite violence.118
Thus, if an Australian court were to follow the American, Canadian and
European precedent, it could strike out s 80.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995
(Cth) because it is not limited to cases where the urging of criminal behaviour
is likely to lead to imminent violence, but applies to all such urgings. On the
other hand, as noted the Australian High Court has found our freedom is
narrower in scope than elsewhere. It is concluded the High Court would find
s 80.2 constitutionally valid.119
Conclusion
This article has considered the history, and current regulation, of behaviour
known as sedition. It has found the federal provision is likely valid, but there
are real question marks over validity of state equivalents, due to the implied
freedom of political communication. Perhaps some believe discussion of this
topic is ‘academic’ given the offence may be perceived anachronistic. There
are two answers. The first is the federal government evidently saw the need in
recent years for an offence of this nature. The second is law is often symbolic,
reflecting society’s values and culture. Removal of state sedition offences,
whether by parliament or court decision, would send an important message
about the confidence we have in our democracy, that it is robust enough to
sustain heated debate and strident criticism, and the general public mature
enough to have ongoing debates of this nature, without fear our institutions of
governance are vulnerable. It would reinforce our nation’s commitment to free
speech, at a time when it appears to be under threat.
118 Boucher v The King [1951] SCR 265.
119 The same conclusion appears in Fighting Words, above n 43, 144; cf Pickering, above n 62,
391: ‘it is difficult to imagine sedition laws could pass as constitutional in a prosecution
today since the High Court’s recognition of the implied freedom of political communication,
as they so plainly inhibit political speech’.
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